58 What one can promise. One can promise actions, but not feelings, for the latter are involuntary. He who promises to love forever or hate forever or be forever faithful to someone is promising something that is not in his power. He can, however, promise those actions that are usually the consequence of love, hatred, or faithfulness, but that can also spring from other motives: for there are several paths and motives to an action. A promise to love someone forever, then, means, "As long as I love you I will render unto you the actions of love; if I no longer love you, you will continue to receive the same actions from me, if for other motives." Thus the illusion remains in the minds of one's fellow men that the love is unchanged and still the same. One is promising that the semblance of love will endure, then, when without self?deception one vows everlasting love. | Friedrich Nietzsche | Human, All Too Human: Section Two: On the History of Moral Feelings - Aphorism #58 | 279 | 13 years, 9 months ago | | | 59 Intellect and morality. One must have a good memory to be able to keep the promises one has given. One must have strong powers of imagination to be able to have pity. So closely is morality bound to the quality of the intellect. | Friedrich Nietzsche | Human, All Too Human: Section Two: On the History of Moral Feelings - Aphorism #59 | 182 | 13 years, 9 months ago | | | 6o Desire to avenge and vengeance. To have thoughts of revenge and execute them means to be struck with a violent--but temporary--fever. But to have thoughts of revenge without the strength or courage to execute them means to endure a chronic suffering, a poisoning of body and soul. A morality that notes only the intentions assesses both cases equally; usually the first case is assessed as worse (because of the evil consequences that the act of revenge may produce). Both evaluations are short-sighted. | Friedrich Nietzsche | Human, All Too Human: Section Two: On the History of Moral Feelings - Aphorism #60 | 152 | 13 years, 9 months ago | | | 61 The ability to wait. Being able to wait is so hard that the greatest poets did not disdain to make the inability to wait the theme of their poetry. Thus Shakespeare in his Othello, Sophocles in his Ajax,21 who, as the oracle suggests, might not have thought his suicide necessary, if only he had been able to let his feeling cool for one day more. He probably would have outfoxed the terrible promptings of his wounded vanity and said to himself: "Who, in my situation, has never once taken a sheep for a warrior? Is that so monstrous? On the contrary, it is something universally human." Ajax might have consoled himself thus. Passion will not wait. The tragedy in the lives of great men often lies not in their conflict with the times and the baseness of their fellow men, but rather in their inability to postpone their work for a year or two. They cannot wait. In every duel, the advising friends have to determine whether the parties involved might be able to wait a while longer. If they cannot, then a duel is reasonable, since each of the parties says to himself: "Either I continue to live, and the other must die at once, or vice versa." In that case, to wait would be to continue suffering the horrible torture of offended honor in the presence of the offender. And this can be more suffering than life is worth.
| Friedrich Nietzsche | Human, All Too Human: Section Two: On the History of Moral Feelings - Aphorism #61 | 164 | 13 years, 9 months ago | | | 62 Reveling in revenge. Crude men who feel themselves insulted tend to assess the degree of insult as high as possible, and talk about the offense in greatly exaggerated language, only so they can revel to their heart's content in the aroused feelings of hatred and revenge. | Friedrich Nietzsche | Human, All Too Human: Section Two: On the History of Moral Feelings - Aphorism #62 | 152 | 13 years, 9 months ago | | |
|
|