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Assuming, then, that in the image of the philosophers of the future there is some characteristic which raises the question whether they would not perhaps have to be sceptics, in the sense indicated immediately above, that would, nonetheless, indicate only one thing about them - and not what they themselves were. With just as much justification they could be called critics, and it's certain they will be men who experiment. In the names with which I have ventured to christen them, I have already particularly emphasized the attempting and the enjoyment in making attempts. Did I do this because, as critics in body and soul, they love to use experiments in a new, perhaps broader, perhaps more dangerous sense? In their passion for knowledge, would they have to go further with daring and painful experiments, than could be considered appropriate by the soft-hearted and mollycoddled taste of a democratic century? There is no doubt that these coming philosophers will at least be able to rid themselves of those serious and not unobjectionable characteristics which separate the critic from the sceptic - I mean the certainty in the measure of value, the conscious use of a unity of method, the shrewd courage, the standing alone, and the ability to answer for themselves. In fact, they will confess that they take delight in saying No and in dismantling things and in a certain thought-out cruelty which knows how to guide the knife surely and precisely, even when the heart is still bleeding. They will be harder (and perhaps not always only on themselves) than humane people might wish; they will not get involved with the "truth," so that the truth can "please" them or "elevate" them and "inspire" them: - by contrast, they will have little faith that the truth in particular brings with it such emotional entertainment. They will smile, these strict spirits, if someone should declare in front of them, "That idea elevates me: how could it not be true?" or "That work delights me: how could it not be beautiful?" or, "That artist enlarges me; how could he not be great?" - Perhaps they are prepared not only to smile at but also to feel a genuine disgust for everything enthusiastic, idealistic, feminine, hermaphroditic in such matters. Anyone who knew how to follow them right into the secret chambers of their hearts would hardly find there any intention to reconcile "Christian feelings" with "the taste of antiquity" or even with "modern parliamentarianism" (a reconciliation which is said to be taking place even among philosophers in our very uncertain and therefore very conciliatory century). These philosophers of the future will demand not only of themselves critical discipline and every habit which leads to purity and strictness in things of the spirit: they could show them off as their own kind of jewellery - nonetheless, for all that they still don't wish to be called critics. It seems to them no small insult inflicted on philosophy when people decree, as happens so commonly today, "Philosophy itself is criticism and critical science - and nothing else!" This evaluation of philosophy may enjoy the applause of all French and German positivists (- and it's possible that it would have flattered even the heart and taste of Kant: we should remember the title of his major works -): our new philosophers will nonetheless affirm that critics are the tools of the philosopher and for that very reason, the fact that they are tools, still a great way from being philosophers themselves! Even the great Chinese citizen of Königsberg was only a great critic.¹¹